Abstract In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the dominating player. We first provide the general theory and discuss the necessary condition for the optimal controls and equilibrium condition by adopting adjoint equation approach. We then present a special case in the context of linear-quadratic framework, in which a necessary and sufficient condition can be asserted by stochastic maximum principle; we finally establish the sufficient condition that guarantees the unique existence of the equilibrium control. The proof of the convergence result of finite player game to mean field counterpart is provided in Appendix.
Introduction
For long, modeling the joint interactive behaviour of individual objects(agents) in a large population in various dynamic systems has been one of the major problems. For instance, physicists often apply the traditional variational methods in Lagrangian and/or Hamiltonian mechanics to study interacting particle systems, which left a shortcoming of extremely high computational cost that made this microscopic approach almost mathematically intractable. To resolve this matter, a completely different macroscopic approach from statistical physics had been gradually developed, which eventually leads to the primitive notion of mean field theory. The novelty of this approach is that particles interact through a medium, namely the mean field term, which aggregates by action and reaction on other particles. Moreover, by passing the number of particles to the infinity in these macroscopic models, the mean field term become a functional of the density function which represents the whole population of particles. This leads to mathematical problems of much less computational complexity.
From the economic perspective, due to the dramatic population growth and rapid urbanization, urgent needs of in-depth understanding of collective strategic interactive behavior of a huge group of decision makers is crucial in order to maintain a sustainable economic growth. Since the vector of fair prices is determined by both demand and supply, it is natural to utilize the aggregation effect from the players' states as a canonical candidate of mean-field term, and then we employ the mean-field models in place of the corresponding classical equilibrium models; moreover, as the decision makers control the evolution of a dynamic system, it is necessary to also incorporate the theory of stochastic differential games (SDGs) in these mean-field models. Over the past few decades, the theory of SDGs has been a major research topic in control theory and financial economics, especially in studying the continuous-time decision making problem between noncooperative investors; in regard to the one-dimensional setting the theory of two person zero-sum games is quite well-developed via the notion of viscosity solutions, see for example Fleming and Souganidis (1989) . Unfortunately, most interesting SDGs are N -player non-zero sum SDGs; see Bensoussan and Frehse [2, 3] and Bensoussan et al. [4] , yet there are still relatively few results in the literature.
As a macroscopic equilibrium model, et al. [10, 11] investigated stochastic differential game problems involving infinitely many players under the name "Large Population Stochastic Dynamic Games"; and independently, Lasry and Lions [12, 13, 14 ] studied similar problems from the viewpoint of the mean-field theory in physics and termed "Mean-Field Games (MFGs)". As an organic combination of mean field theory and theory of stochastic differential games, MFGs provide a more realistic interpretation of individual dynamics at the microscopic level, so that each player will be able to optimize his prescribed objectives, yet with the mathematical tractability in a macroscopic framework. To be more precise, the general theory of MFGs has been built by combining various consistent assumptions on the following modeling aspects: (1) a continuum of players; (2) homogeneity in strategic performance of players; and (3) social interactions through the impact of mean field term. The first aspect is describing the approximation of a game model with a huge number of players by a continuum one yet with a sufficient mathematical tractability. The second aspect is assuming that all players obey the same set of rules of the interactive game, which provide guidance on their own behavior that potentially leads them to optimal decisions. Finally, due to the intrinsic complexity of the society in which the players participate in, the third aspect is explaining the fact that each player is so negligible and can only affect others marginally through his own infinitesimal contribution to the society. In a MFG, each player will base his decision making purely on his own criteria and certain summary statistics (that is, the mean field term) about the community; in other words, in explanation of their interactions, the pair of personal and mean-field characteristics of the whole population is already sufficient and exhaustive. Mathematically, each MFG will possess the following forward-backward structure: (1) a forward dynamic describes the individual strategic behavior; (2) a backward equation describes the evolution of individual optimal strategy, such as those in terms of the individual value function via the usual backward recursive techniques. For the detail of the derivation of this system of equations with forward-backward feature, one can consult from the works of Huang et al. [11] , Lasry and Lions [12, 13, 14] and Bensoussan et al. [5] .
In this article, we consider a class of MFG problems, in which there is a 'significantly big' player playing together with a huge group of 'small' players. The first work along this direction under a Linear Quadratic setting has been investigated by Huang [9] . In their following work [16] , the authors regard the mean field term, represented by the conditional expectation of the small agent, as exogenous to the whole control problem for both the big (the authors called it,'major') and small (minor) players. Nourian and Caines [18] consider a similar problem under a generalized framework. However, the authors also consider the mean field term, which is represented by a conditional probability measure, as exogenous to the control problem for the major player. In contrast, we here consider the mean field term as endogenous for the big (we rephrase as 'dominating' in order to emphasize our distinction from the previous works) player. That is to say, changes in the control of the big (dominating) player would directly affect and even essentially determine the mean field term. Our present setting appears to be natural in the economic literature related to 'actual' governance, as the governor can often take up the initiative or key role on setting up rubrics and regulations to be followed by citizens. To avoid ambiguity, we here regard the 'dominating' major player as a "Dominating Player", and all other minor players as "Representative Agents" throughout the whole paper. In our work, we assume that this dominating player can influence both the mean field term and representative agents directly. We first discuss the necessary condition for the optimality under the most general setting in which both the state coefficients and the objective functions are sufficiently regular (e.g. differentiable); we then consider the Linear-Quadratic case by applying the results obtained in the general theory, which results in three adjoint equations. It is noted that Huang et al. [17] also considered the non-stationary case and obtained the intermediary result with only two adjoint equations, which represents a particular case of our present theory. Besides, concerning the related fixed point issue in any standard MFG problem in order to achieve the equilibrium strategy, we here only need to involve one single affine map, that simplifies much than that in [17] , in which the authors need a couple of two similar mappings; apart from the simplicity of the sufficient condition provided here, it is also directly expressed in terms of the data (coefficients) of the underlying model. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the general theory of the Mean Field Games in the presence of a dominating Player, in which both the state coefficients and the objective functions are sufficiently regular. The necessary condition for optimality and equilibrium is also provided there. Firstly, solving for the control problem of the representative agent, and then the equilibrium condition leads to a coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker Planck equations. As the mean field term is endogenous to the dominating Player, in order to achieve an optimal control, he/she should take into account of the coupled equations when deciding his own controlling strategy. The related fixed point problem is described by six equations. In Section 3, we study a special case with linear states together with linear quadratic objective functions. Due to natural coerciveness of the problem formulation, a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality can be guaranteed. We write down both the stochastic maximum principle and the corresponding adjoint equations. In Section 4, the corresponding fixed point problem is then tackled by considering the related Riccati equation, with which the equilibrium could be achieved. We then provide a 'practical' sufficient condition, which only involves the data (coefficients) of the model without referring to any specific solution of any Riccati equations, for the existence of the equilibrium strategy. In Appendix, proof of the approximate Nash equilibrium for the general setting is also provided.
General Theory
Consider a probability space (Ω, F , P ), a fixed terminal time T and two independent standard Brownian motion W 0 (t) and W 1 (t) taking values in R d0 and R d1 respectively. Also consider two independent initial square integrable random variables ξ 0 ∈ R n0 and ξ 1 ∈ R n1 , which are also assumed to be independent of both W 0 (t) and W 1 (t). Define the filtrations as follows, in which F 0 t and F 1 t are clearly independent to each other,
Let P 2 (R n1 ) be the space of probability measures equipped with the 2 nd Wasserstein metric (for example, see [21] ), W 2 (·, ·) such that for any µ and ν in P 2 (R n1 ),
where the infimum is taken over the family Γ (ν 1 , ν 2 ), the collection of all joint measures with respective marginals ν 1 and ν 2 . Denote dλ to be the Lebesgue measure on R n1 .
Denote x 0 (t) ∈ R n0 and x 1 (t) ∈ R n1 the state evolutions for the dominating player and a representative agent respectively whose dynamics are given by the following stochastic differential equations (SDEs),
The functional coefficients are defined as follows:
The dominating player and the representative agents also possess the following objective functionals respectively:
The functions are defined as follows:
Here u 0 ∈ R m0 and u 1 ∈ R m1 represent the respective controls of the dominating player and the representative agent. The controls u 0 and u 1 are respectively adapted to the filtrations F 0 t and G t . We further assume that the functional form (being a function of (x 1 (t), t)) of u 1 is adapted to F 0 t and uniformly Lipschitz in x 1 (t), even though its value evaluated at x 1 (t) would be adapted to G t instead. Loosely speaking the dominating player takes his own privilege of setting up the framework to be followed by the representative agent. We shall then define the classes of admissible controls for the dominating player and the representative agent by A 0 and A 1 respectively, where A 0 (resp. A 1 ) is a subset of F 0 − (resp. G−)progressively measurable process which are in
The mean field term, µ(t) ∈ P 2 (R n1 ), is the probability measure of the state of the representative agent at time t. Indeed, the dominating player sets rules for representative agent to take into account. One natural consideration is that the dominating player is incapable of tracing the state of each individual's evolution, but only takes account of the overall performance of the community subject to the rules he set, that is his own flow of information, F 0 t . By the same token, each agent cannot fully keep track of any other agents' states and they can only rely on the summarized information of the community provided by the dominating player. Thus it is justifiable to assume that the mean field term, µ(t), is adapted to F 0 t . The dominating player can directly influence both the representative agent and the mean field term, thus we consider µ(t) as endogenous in the consideration of optimal behavior of x 0 (t) rather than as an exogenous variable commonly found in the literature such as that of [9, 18] .
For any probability measure µ ∈ P 2 (R n1 ), we write M 2 (µ) = ( R n 1 |x| 2 dµ(x)) 1 2 . We first give the following assumptions on the functional coefficients:
(A.1) Lipschitz Continuity g 0 , σ 0 , g 1 and σ 1 are globally Lipschitz continuous in all arguments. In particular, there exists K > 0, such that
(A.2) Linear Growth g 0 , σ 0 , g 1 and σ 1 are of linear growth in all arguments. In particular, there exists K > 0, such that
(A.3) Quadratic Condition on the Cost Functional (See (A.5) in Carmona and Delarue [7] .) There exists K > 0, such that
Under the assumptions A.1-A.3, we show in the Appendix that if we have the mean field term coincides with the probability measure of x 1 (t) conditioning on F 0 t , then the optimization problem for the representative agent constitutes to a Mean Field Game. In general, it is more convenient to compare two probability measures if they possess density functions on R n1 . We define the second order operator A 1 and its adjoint A * 1 by
where
* is a positive definite matrix. Let
1 be the solution of the SDE for the representative agent with respect to control u 1 . For any test function f , by Itô's lemma,
The conditional density function
where ω(x) is the initial density function of ξ 1 . We will justify the existence and regularities of the conditional density function p u1 later. We first assume
For any density m, we may write mdλ = m if no ambiguity arises. We impose further assumptions on the functional coefficients:
with bounded derivatives. We will denote, for example, the derivative of g 0 with respect to x 0 by g 0,x0 . They are also Gâteaux differentiable in
(A.5) σ 0 (resp. σ 1 ) is twice continuously differentiable in x 0 ∈ R n0 (resp. x 1 ∈ R n1 ) with bounded first order and second order derivative.
Remark With the regularities on the coefficients, if we have the initial density
. See Proposition 4 and 5 in Le Bris and Lions [6] for details.
Define then a pair of mutually dependent control problems for the dominating player and the representative agent as below:
Problem 21 Control of Representative Agent
Given the process x 0 and an exogenous probability measure-valued process ν (adapted to F 0 t ), find a control u 1 ∈ A 1 which minimizes the cost functional
Problem 22 Equilibrium Condition Given an exogenous probability measure-valued process ν, let M(ν)(t) be the measure induced by the corresponding optimal x 1 (t) found in Problem 21 conditioning on F 0 t . Find the probability measure-valued process µ such that the fixed point property is satisfied: M(µ)(·) = µ(·).
Problem 23 Control of the Dominating Player
Find a control u 0 ∈ A 0 which minimizes the cost functional
where µ is the solution given in Problem 22.
Remark The setting of our problem is different from those mean field related problems with a major player (not a dominating player) commonly found in the literature, such as that in [9, 18] . For example, in [9] , the corresponding objective functions for the major player and i-th minor player are respectively
where the mean field term z is exogenous to both control optimization problems for J 0 and J i . Instead, we here consider the mean field term ν, as established in Problem 22, as endogenous for the dominating player in Problem 23. In particular, changes in control u 0 would affect and even completely determine the mean field term ν accordingly. Our setting appears to be natural in the economic context related to governance, as the governor can sometimes take the initiative to set-up rubrics to be obeyed and followed by citizens; this latter notion is covered in [8] .
We first establish the necessary condition of optimality for the representative agent (Problem 21) by the adjoint equation approach. After resolving Problem 21, we solve for the fixed point in Problem 22. Recall that x 0 (t), the functional form of u 1 (conditioning on F t 0 , u 1 is a function of (x 1 (t), t)) and now together with the input measure-valued process ν are all adapted to F 0 t . We can then rewrite the cost functional (7) for the representative agent as
Lemma 24 (Necessary condition for Problem 21) Given x 0 and ν as in Problem 21, the controlû 1 ∈ A 1 is optimal only if it satisfies the following SHJB:
and the infimum is uniquely attained atû 1 , i.e.
Remark As in the work in Carmona et al. [7] , one convenient set of assumptions on g 1 ,f 1 and h 1 which ensures the unique existence of the minimizer,û 1 (x, x 0 , ν, q) = arg min u L(x, x 0 , ν, u, q), is the affine and convexity assumption. See Lemma 2.1 in [7] for more details. In particular, for
Moreover, the minimizer (x, q) →û 1 (x, x 0 , µ, q) is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (x 0 , µ). Similar conditions for g 0 , f 0 and h 0 can be assumed to guarantee a unique minimizer for the Lagrangian of the control problem for the dominating player in Lemma 26.
Proof To express a necessary condition for optimality, we adopt the stochastic maximum principle. In particular, for anyũ 1 ∈ A 1 ,
pû 1 +θũ1 . By taking derivative with respect to θ in the FP equation (6), we have
As an adjoint process, we consider the backward stochastic differential equation
We consider the inner product
Taking integration on [0, T ] and expectation on both sides yields
Together with the first order condition (10), we have
Recall that the pû 1 (·, t) is a conditional probability density function and hence non-negative, andũ 1 is an arbitrary Markovian control, we haveû 1 is optimal only if
With the definition of L in the theorem, the condition becomes
which provides a necessary condition for the minimization problem. As the minimizer is assumed to be attained atû 1 , which depends on x, x 0 , ν, and DΨ , we arrive for the SHJB Equation.
⊓ ⊔
Replace the arbitrary measure ν by the mean field measure µ. Equating µ := m x0 dλ with pû 1 dλ, the measure of the optimal state of the representative agent conditioning on F 0 t ; the couple (6) and (9) give the following corollary.
Corollary 25 (Necessary condition for Problems 21 and 22)
The control for the representative agent is optimal and the equilibrium condition holds only if the SHJB-FP coupled equations are satisfied
The SHJB-FP coupled equations (11) allow us to obtain the control of the representative agent in terms of a given trajectory of the dominating player x 0 while the equilibrium condition also holds.
We then turn to the optimal problem for the dominating player. As m x0 is not external to the dominating player, the dominating player has to consider both its own dynamic evolution and (11).
Lemma 26 Necessary condition for Problem 23
The control for the dominating playerû 0 is optimal only if
where p(t) satisfies the following adjoint processes
Proof Again we consider the Gâteaux derivative
Introduce the adjoint processes p(t), q(x, t) and r(x, t) as stated in the lemma statement and consider the following differentials
Using the results above, we have
Integrating and taking expectation on both sides gives
Finally we consider (12) and obtain
Sinceũ 0 is arbitrary, the control is optimal for the dominating player only if
Again, we are considering a minimization problem with the first order condition given above. Since the unique existence of a minimizer,û 0 is assumed, we conclude thatû 0 satisfies the infimum
We then conclude the main result in this section.
Theorem 27
The necessary condition for Problems 21, 22 and 23 is provided by the following six equations
r(x, 0) = 0.
Linear Quadratic Case
In this section we present a special case of the problem in the Linear Quadratic setting in which both necessary and sufficient condition could be established. Suppose that the state evolutions of the processes x 0 (t), x 1 (t) are described by
To simplify, the matrices A 0 , C 0 , B 0 , σ 0 ; A 1 , C 1 , B 1 , D, σ 1 are assumed to be constant though the case with time dependent and deterministic function are similar. For if the dominating player did not exist, it is customary to consider z(t) as deterministic, and the equilibrium condition is
We can first find an optimal stochastic control for the representative agent given z, then solve for the fixed point equation (13) . However, one cannot assume z(t) to be deterministic when the dominating player exists, which induces a two-layer problem. Since the dominating player can directly influence the mean field term in the present setting, z(t) should be adapted to the filtration F 0 t . The equilibrium condition hence is
We define control problems for both the dominating player and the representative agent and fist solve for the control problem of the representative agent as if both x 0 (t) and z(t) as exogenous. The next problem is to solve the equilibrium condition (14) as a fixed point property. Finally we solve for the control problem of the dominating player, but now z(t) is regarded as endogenous.
For any vector v and matrix M with appropriate dimensions, we write the inner product v * M v as |v| 2 M for simplicity. Problems 21, 22 and 23 can now be rewritten in the present Linear Quadratic framework as follows:
Problem 31 Control of the Representative Agent Given the process x 0 and κ, find a control u 1 ∈ A 1 which minimizes the cost functional
Problem 32 Equilibrium Condition Let x 1 := x 1,κ be the trajectory of the representative agent with the optimal control found in Problem 31. Find the process z(t) such that the fixed point property is satisfied
Problem 33 Control of the Dominating Player
where z is the solution given in Problem 32.
For simplicity, E 0 , F, R 0 , R 1 , E 1 , ζ 0 , ζ 1 , Q 0 , Q 1 are constant matrices and vectors; Q 0 , Q 1 , R 0 , R 1 are positive symmetric and invertible. Note that Problems 31 and 33 are strictly convex quadratic and coercive, we can write the stochastic principle.
Lemma 34 (Control of Representative Agent)
Problem 31 is uniquely solvable and the optimal controlû 1 (t) is −R −1 1 C * 1 n(t), where n satisfies the adjoint process
Proof Consider a perturbation of the optimal controlû 1 + θũ 1 , whereũ 1 is adapted to the filtration G t . The original state x 1 becomes x 1 + θx 1 with
the optimality ofû 1 is expressed by the following Euler condition
On the other hand, we have
Integrate both side and take expectation, combining with the Euler condition, it becomes
which implies, together with an application of tower property,
Therefore the stochastic maximum principle for the representative agent is expressed by the system
and hence for every exogenous pair (x 0 , κ), this system defines a unique pair (x 1 , n). By the convexity and coerciveness of the cost functional,û 1 is uniquely defined and the sufficient condition is automatically satisfied.
⊓ ⊔ Remark The optimal control has the representation −R
), where P satisfies the symmetric Riccati equation
and g satisfies the BSDE
To obtained the equilibrium condition stated in Problem (32), we simply take expectation conditional on F 0 t on both sides of Equation (16) . By requiring E F 0 t x 1 (t) = z(t), and replace κ(t) by z(t), we have the following system, which is analogical to the SHJB-FP (11) in Section 2.
We next proceed on the problem of the dominating player.
Lemma 35 (Control of the Dominating Player)
Problem 33 is uniquely solvable and the optimal controlû 0 (t) is −R
Proof Considerû 0 + θũ 0 the perturbation of the optimal control, whereũ 0 is adapted to the filtration F 0 t . The original states x 0 , z, m become x 0 + θx 0 , z + θz, m + θm with
The corresponding maximum principle forû 0 is
On the other hand, we can easily check that
Integrating and also taking expectation on both sides of the last equation, together with an application of (19), we deduce that
which implies the desired result by again the application of tower property,
Summarizing the results we obtained so far, we present the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 36
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the unique existence of the solution to Problems 31, 32 and 33 are described by the following six equations in matrix form
Remark One can easily compare these six equations with those stated in Theorem 27. We obtain the same results by applying the general theory, however, it is more convenient to acquire these six equations directly under the Linear Quadratic setting, which also illuminates the power of using the principle of separation. On comparison with the intermediary result obtained in [17] . The latter work did not take account of the third adjoint equation r since it fails to consider the impact on m with respect to the change of the control of the dominating player.
Fixed Point Problem
In this section, we provide a sufficient condition, which solely depends on the coefficients of the mean field game system, for the unique existence of the solution to Problems 31, 32 and 33 by means of tackling a non-symmetric Riccati equation. To facilitate our argument, we define
Hence we can write (21) as
where Q andQ are positive matrices. Consider the following non-symmetric Riccati equation
and the backward ODE
It is easy to check that p(t) = Γ t x(t) + g(t). With respect to this affine form, the forward backward equation (22) Proposition 41 Suppose the following forward-backward ordinary differential equations
Y (T ) = (Q +S)X(T ).
admits a unique solution for any t 0 ∈ [0, T ]. Then there is a unique solution of (23).
Our next theorem concludes the results in this section.
Theorem 42 Let φ(s, t) be the fundamental solution to A. Suppose that
where · stands for usual Euclidean norm. Then there exists a unique solution of equation (21), and hence a unique (mean field) equilibrium exists. Here,
Proof Let x, y be elements in the Hilbert Space H 2 ([0, T ]; R n0+n1+n1 ) endowed with the inner product
H stands for the induced norm under this inner product. We consider the forward backward ordinary differential equation
Observe that both C and Q are positive definite, Equation (25) corresponds a well-defined (deterministic) control problem. Hence, x → X is well defined in H 2 . It suffices to show that this mapping is indeed a contraction. Consider the inner product
Taking integration on [0, T ] yields
By the positivity of C, and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
On the other hand, for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Combining Equations (26) and (27) yields
x H which shows that x → X is a contraction if
Conclusion
In this paper, by adopting adjoint equation approach, we provide the general theory and discuss the necessary condition for optimal controls for both the dominating player and the representative agent, and study the corresponding fixed point problem in relation to the equilibrium condition. A convenient necessary and sufficient condition has been provided under the Linear Quadratic setting; in particular, a illuminative sufficient condition, which only involves the coefficient of the mean field game system, for the unique existence of the equilibrium control has been given. Finally, proof of the convergence result of finite player game to mean field counterpart is provided in Appendix. Applications of the present model in connection with central bank lending and systematic risk in financial context will be provided in the future work.
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A.1 ǫ-Nash Equilibrium
We now establish that the solutions of Problems 21 and 22 is an ǫ-Nash Equilibrium. Suppose that there are N representative agents behaving in similar manner, so that the state of the dominating player and the i-th agent satisfies the following SDE respectively:
where δy is Dirac measure with a unit mass at y. We call Equation (28) the empirical system. The corresponding objective functional for the i-th agent is:
, where u = (u 1 1 , u 2 1 , . . . , u N 1 ). We expect that when N → ∞, the hypothetical approximation is described by (1) , that is:
We call Equation (29) the mean field system. The corresponding limiting objective functional for the i-th player is
Using Corollary 25, the necessary condition for optimality is described by the SHJB-FP coupled equation (11) . To proceed, we assume that the optimal controlû = (û 
Proof Observe that for any t ∈ [0, T ]
By the Lipschitz assumptions, we have
, m x 0 (s)
, m x 0 (s) ds , (31) where C > 0 is a constant, changing line by line, depends only on T and K. By definition, for any Dirac measures δy on R n 1 and density function m, we have
Also observe that the joint measure
on R n 1 . Using the definition of Wasserstein metric, we evaluate
where the last equality results from the fact that {ŷ j −x j } N j=1 are symmetric. Similarly, we also have
Combining with (31) and applying Gronwall's inequality, we have
, m x 0 (s) ds .
(33) By definition of the Wasserstein metric, we have
Hence,
Recall that given F 0 t , {x j 1 } j are identically and independently distributed, we thus get
Similar estimate applies on the second term in Equation (33). Put t = T , we finally have
With the linear growth assumptions, for any t ∈ [0, T ], we easily get the estimates
Applying the Tower property of expectation and the Gronwall's inequality on the sum of the two inequalities above yields
We have the order for the estimate (34)
⊓ ⊔
We also have approximation for the cost functionals.
Proof With the quadratic assumptions (4), we have
, m x 0 (t) dt
In the previous lemmas, we assumed that all players adopt their corresponding mean field optimal controls. By symmetry, the convergences of state dynamics and the cost functionals are then established. To show that the mean field optimal controls u indeed constitute a ǫ-Nash equilibrium on the empirical system, without loss of generality, we assume that the first player did not obey the mean field optimal control. In particular, let u 1 1 be an arbitrary control in A 1 , define u := (u 1 1 ,û 2 1 , . . . ,û N 1 ). We , u 0 (t) dt + σ 0 y 0 (t) dW 0 (t), y 0 (0) = ξ 0 .
dx 0 = g 0 x 0 (t), m x 0 (t) , u 0 (t) dt + σ 0 x 0 (t) dW 0 (t), 
We claim that if mx 0 is the density function ofx i 1 conditioning on F 0 , then we have the convergence y 0 → x 0 , y 1 1 → x 1 1 and y i 1 →x i 1 in the sense of the following lemma , m x 0 (s) ds + E Hence, by applying Gronwall's inequality on Equation (39), we have For the convergence of the 1-st player, the procedure are similar and we do not provide here.
We conclude from the similar procedures to show the convergence of the cost functional. In particular, we have
Theorem A4û is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Proof Summarizing all the obtained results in this section, we can conclude Sinceû 1 1 is optimal control, we have J 1 (û 1 1 ) ≤ J 1 (u 1 1 ). We deduce
Hence,û is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. ⊓ ⊔
